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Abstract
The task of obfuscating writing style using sequence models has previously been investigated
under the framework of obfuscation-by-transfer, where the input text is explicitly rewritten in
another style. These approaches also often lead to major alterations to the semantic content of
the input. In this work, we propose obfuscation-by-invariance, and investigate to what extent
models trained to be explicitly style-invariant preserve semantics. We evaluate our architectures
on parallel and non-parallel corpora, and compare automatic and human evaluations on the ob-
fuscated sentences. Our experiments show that style classifier performance can be reduced to
chance level, whilst the automatic evaluation of the output is seemingly equal to models apply-
ing style-transfer. However, based on human evaluation we demonstrate a trade-off between the
level of obfuscation and the observed quality of the output in terms of meaning preservation and
grammaticality.
1 Introduction
The fact that writing style uniquely characterizes a person, and can be leveraged for automatic author
identification (Holmes, 1998; Stamatatos et al., 2000), has been well-studied in the field of (compu-
tational) stylometry (Neal et al., 2017). Similarly, work on author profiling (Koppel et al., 2002) has
demonstrated that such stylometric features can be used to accurately infer an extensive set of personal
information, such as age, gender, education, socio-economic status, and mental health issues (Eisenstein
et al., 2011; Alowibdi et al., 2013; Volkova et al., 2014; Plank and Hovy, 2015; Volkova and Bachrach,
2016). Traditionally, these techniques relied on expensive human-labelled examples; however, more
recent work has demonstrated near equal accuracy when only relying on self-reports as a distant super-
vision signal (Beller et al., 2014; Emmery et al., 2017; Yates et al., 2017). While these efforts have been
greatly beneficial to various research fields such as computational sociolinguistics (Daelemans, 2013),
the resulting techniques potentially expose users of such media to directed attacks where this informa-
tion can be abused unbeknownst to them. This is particularly harmful to individuals in a vulnerable
position regarding race, political affiliation, mental health, or any other personal information that they
made explicitly unavailable.
Adversarial stylometry, or style obfuscation, is one of the proposed methods aimed at protecting users
against such attacks. Its objective is to rewrite an input text such that a classifier (the adversary) trained
on detecting a particular variable (such as a demographic attribute) is fooled — effectively protecting
this variable. The main challenge is to preserve the original meaning of the input, whilst hiding the
act of obfuscation (Potthast et al., 2016). Recent work on automatic obfuscation (Shetty et al., 2017;
Karadzhov et al., 2017) shows promising results in minimizing performance of the adversary; however,
these models (and as noted by the authors) struggle with correctly maintaining the semantic content of
the input. To illustrate, while rewriting school to wedding1 effectively fools an age classifier into thinking
the text is written by an adult rather than a teen, the original meaning is not preserved in the output.
1Example taken from Shetty et al. (2017).
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We propose that this observed shift in meaning is to some extent a by-product of the formulation
of the obfuscation task. Content words that are strongly related to a particular attribute often play a
significant role in the accuracy of a potential adversary. There is ample evidence for this phenomenon
in age and gender classification work (Koppel et al., 2002; Rao et al., 2010; Burger et al., 2011; Sap et
al., 2014, inter alia). Taking examples from Sap et al. (2014) specifically, features with strong coefficient
weights for gender include e.g. boxers, shaved, girlfriend, beard, fightin for males, and purse, blueberry,
pedicure, hubby, earrings for females. It is therefore not a surprising result that models explicitly tasked
to minimize the performance of such classifiers perform what we will refer to as obfuscation-by-transfer.
To illustrate, the adversary is easily fooled when a sentence looks strongly female even though it was
written by a male. As such, the easiest route to obfuscation from this perspective is a form of style-
transfer: swapping a few strongly target-associated content words for their contrastive variant (wife to
husband, school to wedding). When such variants are also close in semantic spaces that sequence models
make use of, any reconstruction metrics—such as BLEU (Papineni et al., 2002), METEOR (Banerjee
and Lavie, 2005), embedding distances, etc.—might become an inaccurate indication of the change in
meaning.
Our contributions In this work we propose a different approach to automatic obfuscation that we
hypothesize partly overcomes the limitations to preserving meaning of the input: obfuscation-by-
invariance. Here, the objective shifts towards maximizing adversary’s uncertainty, implying its accuracy
on the protected variable should be as close to chance level as possible. Fixing the adversary’s perfor-
mance around chance involves making the input text devoid of stylistic features that strongly correlate
with any of the protected variables, thus producing language that is neutral with respect to these style
differences. We test our hypothesis in several experimental conditions.2 The main component in our
encoder-decoder architecture to achieve a style-invariant encoding of the input is a Gradient Reversal
Layer (GRL) (Ganin and Lempitsky, 2015) inserted between the input sentence embedding and the style
classifier. We investigate the effect of this module in isolation, as well as in a style-invariant soft transfer
setting by using a conditioned decoder (Ficler and Goldberg, 2017). First, to gauge if this architecture
can successfully decode from the style-invariant encoding—and what the effect on adversary perfor-
mance would be—we train sequence-to-sequence models on a parallel corpus of English Bible styles.
Secondly, given that in a realistic obfuscation setting there is no access to such parallel sources, we
drop the target pairs to create an autoencoder setting. In our experiments, we demonstrate a trade-off
around chance-level performance: obfuscation-by-transfer in a parallel setting works well using a many-
to-many translation model, but scores worse in the human evaluation than our style-invariant model. As
such, we pose that there is potential in an style-invariant approach to obfuscation, and it deservers further
investigation.
2 Related Work
2.1 Adversarial Stylometry
The idea that computational stylometry might be used to compromise anonymity was first explored by
Rao et al. (2000). They saw potential to conceal style information in machine translation (MT), but noted
that it was not powerful enough at the time. Kacmarcik and Gamon (2006) continued the proposed line
of work by informing users regarding characteristic features and deeper linguistic cues in their writing
style. Recent related studies can be found in (Caliskan-Islam et al., 2015; Le et al., 2015). Brennan et
al. (2012) explicitly frame obfuscation as an adversarial task and use MT (round-trip translation), similar
to (Caliskan and Greenstadt, 2012). Rule-based perturbations (Juola and Vescovi, 2011) and mixtures
of both (Karadzhov et al., 2017) have also been applied for fully automatic obfuscation. Closest to our
approach is recent work by Shetty et al. (2017), who pursue the task of learning obfuscation-by-transfer
using a Generative Adversarial Network architecture. In their setup, a generator is trained to produce
sentences that maximize the probability assigned by a discriminator that is, in turn, trained to distin-
guish real from generated sentences. While they incorporate different semantic losses, and demonstrate
2All code and data to fully replicate the experiments will be made available soon.
Figure 1: Model architecture with the Gradient Reversal Layer (GRL) module: Left the encoder part,
middle the GRL taking the input sentence embedding (also called context vector) c as input, and right
the decoder part of the architecture. Note that via the GRL working on the context vector, the encoder
part of the model tries to minimize the style classification performance of the MLP, whilst still having to
produce a useful representation for the decoder.
successful obfuscation on age and gender annotated micro-blog data and political speeches, their output
suffers from the lack of semantic preservation we described before. Finally, a style-transfer approach
with potential application to obfuscation is work by Carlson et al. (2017), who investigate textual zero-
shot style-transfer using a sequence-to-sequence MT model inspired by zero-shot translation (Johnson
et al., 2016). Their work demonstrates successful translation between many different versions of the
English Bible.
2.2 Gradient Reversal
The use of a Gradient Reversal Layer (GRL) for learning domain invariant feature representations
was proposed by Ganin and Lempitsky (2015), who demonstrated its viability for learning lightning-
condition invariance in computer vision. Since then, it has been applied to several language tasks: e.g.
textual feature extraction (Pryzant et al., 2017), POS tagging (Kim et al., 2017; Gui et al., 2017), image
captioning (Chen et al., 2017), and document classification (Liu et al., 2017; Xu and Yang, 2017). Most
importantly, Xie et al. (2017) demonstrate the GRL module can be used to implement an adversarial
setting, and to improve performance for a number of language tasks, including generation. These results
bode well for its application to obfuscation-by-invariance.
3 Models
Our base architecture is a neural encoder-decoder (Sutskever et al., 2014) model similar to that of (Wu et
al., 2016), implemented in PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017). Given an input sequence of one-hot encoded
words, the encoder first embeds the words into dense vectors which are then processed by one or more
bidirectional (Schuster and Paliwal, 1997) layers of Long Short-Term Memory (Hochreiter and Schmid-
huber, 1997) (LSTM) cells. The resulting sequence of processed vectors is then merged into a single
dense representation using an inner-attention mechanism that will be described below. After encoding,
a neural language-model is trained to decode the output sequence conditioning on the sentence embed-
ding (so called context vector) resulting from the encoder. Training is accomplished by minimizing the
per-word cross-entropy loss of the target sequence.
In an autoencoder setting, the goal of the network is to simply reconstruct the original sentence based
on the encoded context vector (Lauly et al., ; Li et al., 2015). This set-up can be combined with the GRL
to encourage the encoder to produce attribute-invariant context vectors. The target is the input itself in
the case of an autoencoder (AE) architecture, or a paired sentence in the case of a sequence-to-sequence
(S2S) architecture. See Figure 1 for a visual representations of the base architecture.
3.1 Architecture Components
In addition to the architecture described above, we introduce a few extra components:
Gradient Reversal Layer (GRL) The GRL (Sutskever et al., 2014) is applied on top of the encoder
output. During the forward pass the GRL is the identity function which feeds input to a shallow Multi-
Layer Perceptron (MLP) style classifier. However, during back-propagation the gradient of the loss is
flipped in sign. The idea is that the encoder parameters are optimized to generate sentence embeddings
that do not contain information which can be used to recover the style of the input.
Conditional Decoder (C) Previous research on neural language modelling has shown the effectiveness
of conditioning a language model on sentential and contextual variables (such as tense, modality or
voice). In our experiments, we evaluate a conditional autoencoder in which the decoder is conditioned
on the input style label. We implement conditioning following the approach by Ficler et al. (2017), which
simply concatenates the corresponding attribute embedding vector (in our case, the corresponding style
embedding) to each of the word embeddings input to the decoder. Each style is therefore associated
with an embedding vector c, which is fed into the architecture at each step. In contrast to the simple
autoencoder, the conditional autoencoder allows to choose a desired style at test time. We suspect that
by encouraging the decoder to target a certain style, the output would be more consistent without fully
recovering the targeted style.
Token Transfer (TT) It can be argued that an MT system relying on a parallel corpus of styles (be it
attributes or authors) would perform obfuscation-by-transfer. Moreover, it would likely largely preserve
the original meaning as translation is a meaning-preserving operation (Ide et al., 2002; Dyvik, 2004).
However, such parallel corpora are generally not available and have very high associated compilation
costs, as it would require large amounts of identical information (ideally on sentence-level) to be written
by e.g. teens and adults. Textual style transfer by MT is therefore not a plausible use-case for obfus-
cation. However, it does provide a good indication of the performance of an obfuscation model under
the framework of obfuscation-by-transfer. For this, we apply a sequence-to-sequence translation model
trained on style as discussed by (Carlson et al., 2017). Following the work of (Johnson et al., 2016),
we use a target style token, allowing for a model trained on many-to-many translation that can be used
to rewrite an input sentence in a different style simply by prepending a target token. This is the only
configuration that uses Bahdanau attention (Bahdanau et al., 2014), as it is not tested in combination
with the GRL (which tends to negate the style token).
3.2 Architecture Details
All our models use 300-dimensional embeddings. Both the encoder and the decoder are implemented
with a single layer of 1000 LSTM cells. The sequence of hidden states from the encoder are merged into
a single representation using a feature-wise inner-attention mechanism. Letwt and ht denote respectively
the input word embedding and hidden state of the LSTM for step t for a total of n total steps. The ith
feature of the sentence embedding c is computed by a weighted sum over the ith feature of the hidden
states:
ci =
n∑
t=1
atih
t
i (1)
where each weight ati is computed by:
ati =
exp([W T zt]i)∑n
s=1 exp([W
T zs]i)
(2)
In Equation 2, zt stays for the concatenation of wt and ht, W ∈ R(D+H)×H is an additional projection
matrix to be learned, and D and H denote the dimensionalities of the word embedding matrix and the
LSTM layer respectively. In comparison to traditional merging models (such as max or mean pooling),
the additional parameters help the model to learn what input words and what features are more impor-
tant for the task. This is similar to conventional attention over hidden activation vectors with the main
difference being that weighting is done feature-wise and all information flow from the encoder to the
decoder is passed through the bottleneck of the single output encoding vector. Note that a traditional
alignment-style attention mechanism is not compatible with the application of the GRL, since the latter
must have scope over all information being passed from the encoder to the decoder.
The decoder is conditioned by the output encoding by concatenating the encoding vector to the input
of the decoder at each step. This facilitates learning by increasing the gradient signal to the encoder.
All model parameters are optimized with Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2014) in mini-batches of 50 examples
and a learning rate of 0.001 which is decreased by 0.75 after each epoch. To avoid overfitting, dropout
(Srivastava et al., 2014) is applied to the input of each LSTM layer with a dropping probability of 0.25
and we stop training when loss stops decreasing for 3 epochs. During test time, we approximate the
model best output sequence with beam search and a beam of size 5. GRL is implemented with a single-
layer MLP with dimensionality matching the one of the encoder.
4 Experimental Set-up
Our main goal is investigating the effectiveness of obfuscation-by-invariance, and more specifically to
what extent style-invariant representations preserve sentential semantics of the input. To this end, we
perform three experiments for different corpora and obfuscation settings, using the components described
above. In each of these settings, there is an adversary trained to detect the to be obfuscated variable. We
describe our experiments and evaluations below.
4.1 Data
We use a highly parallel corpus of five different versions of the English bible (retrieved from GitHub3,
originally collected from openbible.info4). These versions are semantically consistent, but vary
stylistically across different aspects; BBE is written in simplified English, YLT follows the syntactic
structures of the original Greek and Hebrew, and other versions (KJV, DBY, ASV) correspond to older
editions reflecting diachronic variations. The sentence-level verse coding (book + chapter + verse ID)
is used for almost perfect pairing between the different versions (some missing pairs were removed),
forming style quintuplets, which were tokenized using spaCy5 (Honnibal and Montani, 2017). The
style tuples are divided amongst train (80%), dev (10%), and test (10%) sets—ensuring all sentences in
the development and test splits are unseen, regardless of the style combination that they occur in—and
all style combinations (excluding a same-style combination) are used to form 620,752 pairs.
4.2 Adversary
The adversary is a sentence-level classifier in the form of fastText6; a simple linear model with
one hidden embedding layer that learns sentence representations using bag of words or n-gram input,
producing a probability distribution over the given styles using the softmax function. The classifier is
trained on the source side of the training split, as these are the instances we intend to obfuscate. It is run
for 20 epochs using 100 dimensional embeddings, uni and bi-grams, a learning rate of 0.01, and a bucket
size of 1M. It achieves an accuracy of 86.6%, and chance level performance for the adversary is 20%
given 5 classes with an even distribution.
4.3 Evaluation
To automatically evaluate the reconstruction and semantic preservation of our generated sentences, we
use MT metrics, as well as distance in semantic embedding space. Obfuscation is measured by the
difference of the adversary’s accuracy compared to chance level.
3https://github.com/scrollmapper/bible_databases
4http://www.openbible.info/labs/cross-references/
5https://spacy.io/
6https://github.com/facebookresearch/fastText
MT Metrics (BLEU, METEOR) We calculate BLEU-4 and METEOR (Papineni et al., 2002; Banerjee
and Lavie, 2005) using nlg-eval7. Given that this is not a standard MT task, we provide these scores
between the generated sentence and the source sentence (←), as well as the generated sentence and
the target sentence (→). For the sequence-to-sequence models, → is the primary indicator of success-
ful obfuscation-by-transfer. However, ← gives some indication how much the output is still related to
the original. Introducing the GRL to this models should decrease scores for both ← and →. For the
autoencoder, we only have ← to evaluate, which should generally strongly decrease when adding the
GRL.
Word Mover’s Distance (WMD) To assess the word embedding distance of the obfuscated sentence
to the original, we take the Word Mover’s Distance (WMD) (Kusner et al., 2015), based on the English
fastText embeddings for Wikipedia (Bojanowski et al., 2016). WMD takes the distance between two
sentences in a weighted point cloud of embedded words as the minimum cumulative distance that this
cloud for sentence A needs to travel to align with that of sentence B, and is shown to capture some
semantic relations.
Adversary Impact (∆ acc) We compare the accuracy of the adversary on the generated sentence to that
of the original to asses obfuscation strength. However, as our goal is to keep the adversary’s performance
level close to chance, we define ∆ accuracy = accuracy − p where p is majority baseline. Therefore, if
∆ accuracy is negative, this means the adversary’s performance has dropped below chance, and the task
is closer to obfuscation-by-transfer rather than by-invariance. Subsequently, a positive score indicates
the extent to which obfuscation fails to match both cases.
Gaussian Noise (µ) To enforce a significant change in the decoded output, one can simply add a
Gaussian noise mask to the context vector during generation time. We generate this mask as a random
vector from a Gaussian Distribution N(0, µ), where µ = {0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20} and add this to
the values of the context vector. This noise can be utilized to increase obfuscation (due to more random
decoding behaviour) at the cost of quality of the output.
4.4 Experiments
Using all components discussed above, we define three experimental settings to measure the effect of
applying a GRL and conditional decoder to achieve obfuscation-by-invariance. (1) We train our archi-
tecture on the style pairs from the English Bible corpus in a many-to-many sequence-to-sequence setting.
By introducing a GRL here, words that are highly indicative of the target style are not captured by the
encoder. To achieve an effective many-to-many MT system (and thus style-transfer) setting we prepend
the <2{stylename}> token. (2) We train an autoencoder on disconnected pairs. Here we introduce
both the GRL, plus the conditioned decoder. We hypothesize that the conditioned decoder allows for soft
style-transfer from a neutral encoding, implying it would preserve semantic structure better than the MT
model. (3) We use Gaussian noise to make the sequence-to-sequence and autoencoder models equivalent
in obfuscation performance to allow for direct comparison.
5 Results
5.1 Experimental Results
All results and automatic evaluations are shown in Table 1. As we hypothesized, using style-transfer for
obfuscation works well overall, performing either at, or below chance level. However, looking at the
target BLEU and METEOR, the sequence-to-sequence model without the target token generates sentences
that are closer to source than they are to the target; and achieves low scores overall, with the sentences
being quite far off based on WMD. However, note that this is many-to-many translation without any signal
regarding the target, given languages with largely the same vocabulary. As such TT is a more realistic
reflection of style-transfer success. In terms of translation quality it barely improves over the original
baseline, but it does successfully perform obfuscation-by-transfer, as indicated by the 12% accuracy
7https://github.com/Maluuba/nlg-eval
model C GRL TT PPL BLEU← MTR← BLEU→ MTR→ WMD ∆ ACC
S2S 9.08 22.0 25.3 17.8 23.6 1.50 1.6
S2S x 9.27 21.8 25.2 16.9 22.9 1.50 6.9
S2S x 7.38 34.9 30.5 39.2 29.9 1.24 -12.0
AE 1.51 79.5 52.9 - - 0.25 64.4
AE x 1.99 60.0 41.2 - - 0.65 50.8
AE x x 1.87 51.9 38.1 - - 0.79 18.3
source 100.0 100.0 36.0 34.5 0.00 66.6
Table 1: Results for the Bible experiments. The first column (model) indicates the setting of our base
architecture: either sequence-to-sequence (S2S), or autoencoder (AE). The second column specifies
which modules were incorporated: C for the conditioned decoder, GRL for the Gradient Reversal Layer,
and tt for the prepended style token. The results show perplexity on the dev set (PPL), BLEU and
METEOR between source (←) / target (→) and the obfuscated sentence, the Word Mover’s Distance
score between source and the obfuscated sentence (WMD) and the extent to which the obfuscated sentence
pushes the adversary to chance level performance (∆ ACC). In the last row, we note a ‘source’ baseline,
that is achieved by simply copying the source. This shows how overall how much source and target
overlap, and the actual above-chance performance of the adversary.
AE AE + GRL AE + C + GRL
µ BLEU← MTR← ∆ ACC BLEU← MTR← ∆ ACC BLEU← MTR← ∆ ACC
- 79.5 52.9 64.4 60.0 41.2 50.8 51.9 38.1 18.3
0.01 78.7 52.2 64.1 59.7 41.4 50.5 52.0 38.5 18.5
0.05 52.9 38.9 57.2 54.8 39.1 47.6 49.1 37.2 16.5
0.10 14.7 21.6 36.1 32.8 32.7 36.9 40.7 33.6 11.6
0.15 4.2 14.7 23.3 25.3 26.2 24.3 30.0 29.1 4.6
0.20 1.5 11.3 16.4 15.3 21.5 15.5 21.1 24.9 0.0
Table 2: Effect of adding Gaussian Noise (µ) to the autoencoder.
below chance. Assessing the performance of the GRL in this setting, it does not seem improve translation,
nor obfuscation — which was largely in line with our expectations.
The autoencoder setting provides a clearer look into the performance of the GRL, in particular in terms
of obfuscation-by-invariance. The plain autoencoder to some extent successfully reproduces the target;
looking at BLEU, the adversary performance, and WMD, it is still closely related to the input. Introducing
the GRL does impact the relation to the source sentence, but does gain little in comparison on obfus-
cation performance. However, when the conditioned decoder is added to the architecture, obfuscation
performance is visibly impacted more than the decrease in BLEU and METEOR. Lastly, the effect of
adding a Gaussian noise mask on the decoder can be found in Table 2. Around 0.15, the metrics seem
to be largely comparable in terms of BLEU, METEOR and ∆ accuracy. We further investigate the three
most suitable models (S2S + TT, AE + GRL + C, and AE + GRL + C + µ = 0.15) in a human evaluation.
5.2 Human Evaluation
For the human evaluation, 20 pairs (original, obfuscated) were sampled from the output of the three
models of interest (making 60 pairs in total). Each pair was rated by four participants (all with a linguis-
tics background), on three dimensions using a three point scale. These dimensions included semantic
consistency between the original and the obfuscated sentence, the syntactical coherence of the latter, and
the amount of changes in the output. The participants were made aware of which sentence of the pairs
was the original, and were explicitly asked to rate the dimensions with the original as reference. The
participants were not aware that there were multiple models, and the pairs were shuffled so that compar-
SEMANTICS GRAMMATICALITY CHANGES
1 Semantics are broken; sentence
does not mean the same.
Part(s) of, or the complete sen-
tence is garbled.
Change in special characters or
flipping a single word.
2 Slight semantic change, but not
intrusive.
Slight word order change that is
ungrammatical.
Multiple words were changed,
but they align with the original.
3 Semantics are intact, changes do
not alter the meaning.
Grammaticality has not been af-
fected.
New parts have been introduced
/ rewritten in the sentence.
Table 3: Explanations per rating for the three dimensions in the human evaluation study.
SEMANTICS GRAMMATICALITY CHANGES
S2S + TT 1.88 2.21 2.43
AE + GRL + C 2.12 2.32 1.99
AE + GRL + C + µ = 0.15 1.35 1.66 2.65
Table 4: Average scores and standard deviation for the three dimensions in the human evaluation.
ing between pairs with the same original was impossible. To simplify the comparison to the original, we
only sampled from BBE (basic English Bible). See Table 4 for a sample of the instructions given to the
participants, and Table 3 for the results.
According to the evaluation results, AE + GRL + C has the overall preference of the raters in all three
dimensions. Specifically, given that we are interested in semantic preservation, this model is evaluated
better than a style-transfer model that has some access to semantic relations between source and target
on the SEMANTICS dimension. Note that based on the CHANGES dimension, the AE + GRL + C is the
most conservative, which is in line with the BLEU and METEOR scores in Table 1, and likely propagates
into the GRAMMATICALITY dimension.
5.3 Qualitative Analysis
In this section we perform a manual comparison of the text generated by the three models that were eval-
uated by our raters in the previous section. Accordingly, we will identify the strengths and weaknesses
of our experimental approach, and propose possible lines of future work.
One of the issues we identified with obfuscation-by-transfer was that of small, localized changes in
the input, specifically focussing on words that are most relevant to the adversary. When looking at longer
sentences such as Table 5, some (semi-)correct variants can be found in e.g. town → city, waste land
→ dry land, and in Table 6, beryl→ onyx, stamp→ seal, but incorrect ones also remain rest→ work.
Overall, the longer the sequence, the more variation can be observed.
A more interesting observation is that some parts of sentences are added to by the models, e.g. there
is without a waste land ; and she makes an dry land—while incorrectly inserting ‘without’, the rest can
be considered is a correct expansion. The same holds for Table 6, where fixed in twisted frames of gold
is expanded to whereupon they bound in the skillfully woven red frames of gold , partly erroneously,
similar to living men in Table 5. Contrastively, the autoencoder + GRL in particular also seems to favour
somewhat compressed phrases, removing adjectives such as young in young ox, strong in strong city,
beryl in beryl stones and not incorporating an unpeopled living altogether.
When directly comparing the sequence-to-sequence and autoencoder + GRL examples, it can be in-
ferred that the transfer approach seems (at least in these examples) quite conservative, sticking to an
almost exact alignment, and only making small changes. This however also causes the autoencoder to
replace words with unrelated variants or insert not directly related ones; the same behaviour can also be
observed in the sequence-to-sequence, however.
The output of the autoencoder shows some evidence that actual rewrites of the sentence are possible,
which is potentially an interesting path to pursue. Including different variables in the conditioned decoder
would make experiments in this direction feasible. It must be noted that evidence of style-neutral rewrites
ORIGINAL For the strong town is without men, an unpeopled living - place; and she has become
a waste land: there the young ox will take his rest, and its branches will be food for
him.
S2S + TT For the strong city is powerless, an astonishment living and she is become a corrupt
land: a young ox shall rest, and its branches shall be for him.’
AE + GRL +
C
For the city is without living men, there is without a waste land; and she makes an
dry land: an ox shall take his work, and their branches shall be food for him.
AE + GRL +
C + µ = 0.15
A man dwelleth without an dry land; and, wandering she - place; men shall there
become a waste a land: an ox - goat shall take his horses, and his branches shall be
prepare for him .
Table 5: Example 1 — Isaiah 27:10
ORIGINAL Then they made the beryl stones, fixed in twisted frames of gold and cut like the
cutting of a stamp, with the names of the children of Israel.’
S2S + TT Then they made the onyx stones as a hundred stones, burning in engraved stones of
gold, and cut as the marks of a seal, with the names of the children of Israel.
AE + GRL +
C
Then they wrote the stones, whereupon they bound in the skillfully woven red frames
of gold and made like the cutting of a stamp, with the names of the children of Israel.’
AE + GRL +
C + µ = 0.15
Then they presented the pillars that belonged in Henadad. The bottom of fine gold
and made like the jewels of a stamp of them, at the dial of the children of Israel.’
Table 6: Example 2 — Exodus 39:6
is difficult to find in the Bible; not only due to the archaic constructions, but more so due to the fact that it
requires a level of expertise to recognize style shifts. Applying the autoencoder to data that is non-parallel
at least has some ground given the current results, and should definitely be part of future work.
6 Conclusion
We presented an alternative framing of the task of automatic style obfuscation—obfuscation-by-
invariance—and tested several components in a neural encoder-decoder architecture that were hypoth-
esized to achieve style-invariant rewrites of the input text. We tested the effect of a Gradient Reversal
Layer and a conditioned decoder for obfuscation in parallel and non-parallel settings. Although strong
evidence for style-neutral text was difficult to find for the Bible corpus, we demonstrated through human
evaluation that our autoencoder architecture trained on non-parallel data obtained a better evaluation than
a model trained on parallel data with partial access to semantic relations between source and target. In
our qualitative analysis we found evidence for semantically correct local changes of the input, as well as
partial rewrites that fit the context of the verses. These results bode well for extending this architecture
to other non-parallel corpora to test obfuscation in a practical use-case, e.g. author attributes such as age
and gender.
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